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Looking for the Party? The Effects of Partisan Change on Issue Attention 
in UK Acts of Parliament 
 
 
Abstract: 
Political parties matter for government outcomes. Despite this general finding for political 
science research, recent work on public policy and agenda-setting has found just the opposite; 
parties generally do not matter when it comes to explaining government attention. While the 
common explanation for this finding is that issue attention is different than the location of 
policy, this explanation has never truly been tested. Through the use of data on nearly 65 
years of UK Acts of Parliament, this paper presents a detailed investigation of the effect 
parties have on issue attention in UK Acts of Parliament. It demonstrates that elections alone 
do not explain changes in  the distribution of policies across issues. ,QVWHDGWKHSDUWLHV¶
organizations, responses to economic conditions, and size of the parliamentary delegation 
influence the stability of issue attention following a party transition.  
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 The increased attention of agenda-setting research on partisan politics has often been 
at odds with the belief that parties drive politics. For example, recent literature finds little 
evidence of issue ownership (e.g. John et al 2014) or a strong election effect (Baumgartner et 
al 2009) on the content of political agendas. From this perspective, parties¶ODUJHVWGLIIHUHQFHV
are in how they use the political process (e.g. Bevan et al 2011; Jennings et al 2011a). Partisan 
differentiation on issues is at best one source of policy variation (e.g. Baumgartner et al 
2009). These weak findings with respect to the impact of parties in agenda-setting research 
have been explained through the relatively stable nature of policy attention across issues, 
despite the multitude of research demonstrating the importance of political parties in politics 
more broadly.  
In contrast to the findings for policy attention, scholars show that political parties play 
a prominent role in everything from party manifestos and elections (e.g. Adams 1999; Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Dalton 2008; Adams and Somer-Topçu 2009; Somer-Topçu 2009; 
de Vries and Hobolt 2012), to government formation and termination (e.g. Müller and Strøm 
2000). Moreover, evidence of their effects on legislative behavior (e.g. Huber 1996; Döring 
2003), policy outcomes (e.g. Hibbs 1977; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Schmidt 2006), 
institutional reform (e.g. Cox 1987), and oversight of policy implementation and the 
bureaucracy (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002) demonstrates the importance of political parties in 
policy-making. Nevertheless, research on public policy and budget outcomes indicates only 
PL[HGHYLGHQFHIRUSDUWLHV¶UHOHYDQFH$OWDnd Lowry 2000; McAtee et al 2003; Soroka and 
Wlezein 2010). When it comes to issue attention1 however, agenda-setting research would 
argue that parties in government maintain a certain level of attention on issues due to world 
                                                          
1 ,VVXHVDUH³WRSLF>V@«>WKDWGHILQH@VXSSRUWDPRQJHOHFWRUV´RUVKLIWVXSSRUWEHWZHHQ
parties (Budge 1993, 43). Issue attention therefore refers to the relative level of focus on a 
topic that is consequently important to groups within society such as the environment. 
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events, political and economic systems and also respond to opposition critiques (see Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Seeberg 2013). Attention to an issue and the direction of 
policy on that issue are clearly two different things that help explain the differences in the 
findings of these two literatures, but how accurate is this agenda-setting explanation and more 
importantly, how robust are the non-findings concerning parties in the agenda-setting 
literature when the analysis takes into account SDUWLHV¶VSHFLILForganizational characteristics 
and dynamics? As complex organizations balancing multiple goals (Strøm 1990), SDUWLHV¶
influence on the government agenda2 likely depends on their decision-making structures and 
strategic context.  We develop a theory of aggregate partisan influence that focuses on the 
factors determining WKHLPSDFWRISDUWLHV¶internal decision-making process, contextual 
demands for policy, and SDUWLHV¶legislative ability to influence policy. 
 To examine the extent of party effects on changes in issue attention we use data from 
the UK Policy Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org.uk) on UK Acts of Parliament from 
1945 to 2008. In particular, we study differences in the level of attention to issues by a party 
through time series analyses aimed at pinpointing party influence from differences in party 
organization, elections and institutional control, using a new measure of the SDUOLDPHQW¶V
aggregate level agenda stability introduced by Mortensen et al (2011). This measure compares 
the differences in attention, issue by issue, creating an overall index of stability in issue 
attention from year to year. The results show a clear pattern of revisions to laws by newly 
elected governments suggesting an aggregate process of policy change following party 
transitions. This aggregate approach complements the issue-by-issue research that finds only 
limited partisan influence by placing each issue in the broader context of policy change. It 
also builds on similar work focused on understanding aggregate patterns of issue attention 
                                                          
2 7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGDUHIHUVWRWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISROLFLHVHQDFWHGZLWKLQD\HDUDFURVV
issues.  
Commented [sb1]: This should remain by party. It is like saying 
we separate our sample by gender. 
4 
 
(e.g. Jennings et al 2011b; Boydstun et al 2014). Specifically, we find evidence that for 
incumbent governments a poor economy, a larger legislative majority and a long tenure in 
office encourages governments to stick to a consistent legislative program. However, 
transitions that occur in rough economic times and new governments with large legislative 
majorities decrease the stability of attention across issues. Decreased agenda stability 
following a party transition indicates a change in issue attention from the previous 
government7KLVFKDQJHLPSOLHVDVXEVWDQWLYHGLIIHUHQFHLQSDUWLHV¶SUHVFULSWLRQVDFURVV
issues for an ailing economy. However, large party memberships increase stability as more 
member dominated parties are less able to institute radical changes in issue attention.  
The findings in this paper hold important implications for democratic government and 
electoral accountability. Given the predominance of parties in advanced democracies, how 
can voters influence government policies if the JRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGDGRHVQRWFKDQJH
following a partisan transition?  This means that when the partisan control of the cabinet 
transitions changes the new government focuses on different issues than the previous 
government. Optimistically, our analysis indicates that parties provide voters with meaningful 
choices across important issues. 
The rest of this paper takes the following form. First, we discuss several of the more 
commonly found (or unfound) party effects seen through policy, issue attention and policy 
processes. Second, we consider these observations in light of the agenda-setting literature and 
offer several expectations for how and when parties will demonstrate an effect in the agenda-
setting process. Next, we discuss the data that we use to test our hypotheses and present our 
analysis that tests each proposed party effect. Finally, we conclude the paper with a brief 
summary and consider how (or how not) to look for the effect of parties in public policy and 
policy agendas. 
 
Party Effects: Policy, Attention or Process 
Commented [I2]: please check this sentence 
 
[SB] This may be a little clearer. 
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 Political party influence has been studied in a variety of contexts related to public 
policy and policy outcomes. Much of this research looks at the effect of party governments on 
social and economic policies (Schmidt 2006). From the perspective of party policy 
accountability, this literature points out important differences in the types of policies that 
parties develop in office. 3DUWLHV¶Solicies depend on the preferences of their historical 
constituencies (Hibbs 1977; Hicks and Swank 1992; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Tsebelis 
2002). However, linking specific political parties to policy outcomes is difficult in many 
democracies because single party governments are unusual and SDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDUHSXW
through complex, multi-layered institutional contexts (Tsebelis 2002; Schmidt 2006). 
Furthermore, changing public opinion and feedback loops between public policy and opinion 
complicate leaders¶UHVSRQVHV to public demands (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).  Even under 
divided government parties seek to draw economic policies in their preferred direction 
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1995). Alt and Lowry (2000) demonstrate that parties in government 
allocate budgets according to their policy goals, although others contest their results (McAtee 
et al. 2003). Focusing on labour policies, Tsebelis (2002) adds that ideological disagreements 
between coalition parties and institutional constraints limit the amount of legislation that 
coalition governments generate. Furthermore, Huber and Shipan (2002) illustrate that party 
strategies influence the length and detail of legislation on health care policy across US States 
and labour policies cross-nationally. While these studies find some evidence that parties 
develop public policy in line with their preferences, they generally focus on a specific policy 
RXWFRPHEDVHGRQ/LSVHWDQG5RNNDQ¶V67) cleavage theory, such as social or economic 
policy, budget outcomes, or the total number of bills passed, without taking into consideration 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VEURDGHUDWWHQWLRQWRLVVXHV.  
7KLVSHUVSHFWLYHKDVEHHQH[WHQGHGWRVXJJHVWWKDWSDUWLHVµRZQ¶ issues related to their 
historical constituencies, policy preferences and experiences in government (Budge and Farlie 
1983; Egan 2013). Issue ownership theory FRQQHFWVSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOVXFFHVVWRWKHVDOLHQFH
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of the issues that they own in the electorate. Parties that own an issue benefit by emphasizing 
that issue in their electoral appeals (Petrocik 1996). Parties develop ownership through their 
emphasis on issues when they come to office (Egan 2013). For example, socialist parties in 
(XURSHµRZQ¶ODERur issues because they have historically organized on these issues and 
focused their resources on them in government. Following from this perspective, socialist 
parties will benefit when topics related to labour and employment are salient and will 
presumably focus attention on these issues in office to maintain an image of competence 
(Carey 2009). Therefore, a socialist party shifts WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLVVXHDWWHQWLRQWRSODFH
greater emphasis on labour issues. The traditional issue ownership or cleavage based approach 
to party politics largely assumes a mostly fixed type of policy emphasis from a party over 
time, although empirical evidence suggests that the LVVXHVYRWHUVDWWULEXWHWRSDUWLHV¶SULPDU\
competencies is frequently incomplete or inconsistent and can change over time (Bélanger 
and Meguid 2008). )XUWKHUPRUHSDUWLHV¶historically µRZQHG¶LVVXHVSURYLGHOLWWOHguidance 
for the substance or quality of the policies parties pursue once they enter into office (Egan 
2013).   
 Research from an agenda-setting perspective, however, has found less evidence that 
parties play an influential role in determining levels of issue attention in various government 
outputs such as executive speeches, laws and budgets. This focus on issue attention is not too 
dissimilar from the expected effects of cleavages or issue ownership on bill productivity 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), but the empirical results 
from the agenda-setting literature are at best mixed (e.g. Baumgartner et al 2009; Jennings et 
al 2011b; John et al 2014). From the agenda-setting perspective, political and economic 
conditions limit the JRYHUQPHQW¶Vability to focus attention on strictly partisan goals (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Like research from a party politics perspective, this work 
emphasizes the role of institutional structures that OLPLWSDUWLHV¶DELOLW\WRDGYDQFHWKHLUmost 
preferred policy goals (Jennings et al 2011a; Bevan et al 2011). For example, in institutional 
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contexts with a large number of parties in parliament and in which minority governments 
regularly occur, the government often undertakes policy salient to opposition parties (Seeberg 
2013). Overall, this literature indicates the institutional and contextual reasons why we may 
expect a lack of partisan effects. We add that a fuller explanation of party influence would 
consider how internal organizational characteristics may influence the government agenda.  
Neither the party politics nor the agenda-setting approaches suggest that parties play 
an unimportant role in the government process. Parties are the primary organizations 
controlling governments in advanced industrial democracies. However, studies from these 
perspectives find contrasting and mixed evidence of their substantive impact. This 
inconsistency may exist from differences in the operationalization of the dependent variables, 
but the differences are likely to also reflect fundamental disagreements over the way in which 
each literature expects parties to matter. Tests of government accountability and cleavage 
based accounts often focus on trends linked to pDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDODQGSROLF\VWUDWHJLHVon a 
subset of issues RURQWKHVSHFLILFORFDWLRQRISDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVRQWUDGLWLRQDOHFRQRPLF
policies without fully considering the role of broader effects on their attention across a range 
of issues. Agenda-setting explanations regularly focus on broader processes that influence the 
greater distribution of attention across issues, but avoid directly specifying the issues on 
which parties most likely differ (e.g. Jennings et al 2011b). To explain these differences, we 
examine thHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGDVWDELOLW\ or the change in the distribution of attention across 
issues from year to year (see Mortensen et al 2011). By studying agenda stability we seek to 
isolate the effect of party differences without having to directly specify or impose our 
assumptions of SDUWLHV¶priorities on each issue. In particular, we develop a series of 
K\SRWKHVHVWKDWOLQNSDUWLHV¶RUJDQL]DWLRQDQGpolicy strategies to agenda stability. 
 
Hypotheses: Maintaining Stability 
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Studies of policy responsiveness and agenda-setting frequently predict differences in 
which policies parties pursue in office based on their issue priorities and political context. 
However, tKHVHDFFRXQWVPD\PLVVSDUWLHV¶LQIOXHQFHRQWKHSROLF\DJHQGDLIWKH\IRFXV only 
on the broad differences in party preferences and ignore the organizational and contextual 
factors that lead to the formation of those preferences. To reconcile these approaches, we add 
that parties are dynamic and strategic organizations that face competing pressures on their 
agenda. In addition, differences between parties will lead to the most dramatic changes in 
agenda stability immediately following changes in control of government. Overall, our 
DSSURDFKWUDFHVSDUWLHV¶GHFLVLRQ-making processes from intra-party politics, the external 
GHPDQGIRUSROLF\FKDQJHDQGILQDOO\SDUWLHV¶SDUOLDPHQWDU\FRQWURO 
Research on party behavior and public policy often treats parties as if parties are 
unified organizations in which internal decision-making processes are unimportant for 
understanding their behavior. However, as organizations, parties face demands from multiple 
groups within the party that potentially contain divergent policy goals, such as activists, 
elected representatives and organized factions (Harmel and Janda 1994; Ceron 2013; Greene 
and Haber forthcoming). Scholars find that pressures on party leadership stemming from 
regional party groups, intra-party factions or organizational influences affect numerous 
RXWFRPHVVXFKDVWKHSDUW\¶VSODWIRUP+DUPHODQG7DQand parliamentary behavior 
(Huber 1996; Laver 1999; Carey 2009). The preferences of intra-party groups constrain party 
leaders most as an election nears (Ceron 2013). Empirically, internal divisions often lead to 
FKDQJHVLQSDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVDQGSDUOLDPHQWDU\EHKDYLRU&HURQ*UHHQHDQG
Haber forthcoming).  
3DUWLHV¶RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHPRUHIOXLGWKDQPXFKUHVHDUFKDVVXPHV. For example, party 
memberships have declined throughout much of Western Europe (Tan 1997), internal 
candidate selection rules vary within countries over time (Shomer 2014), members of 
parliament switch parties with some frequency (2¶%ULHQDQGShomer 2013), and the degree of 
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internal disagreements vary over time based on the electoral context both in parliament and at 
WKHSDUWLHV¶RZQQDWLRQDOPHHWLQJV+XJDQG6KXOW]*UHHQHDQG+DEHr forthcoming). 
More broadly, parties have generally democratized candidate selection rules and increased the 
SDUW\OHDGHUV¶VHOHFWRUDWH.HQLJ 
Like other organizations in Western Europe, parties in the United Kingdom have also 
undergone organizational changes. Parties have experienced declining memberships, although 
this decrease is not monotonic (Tan 1997). For example, Labour reversed the trend in the 
1990s (Whitely and Seyd 2002). Consequently, activism by individual members declined over 
the last half century (Seyd and Whiteley 2004). As a response, both Labour and the 
Conservatives increased JUDVVURRWVPHPEHUV¶DELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHWKHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLS
selection (Cross and Blais 2012). This trend is essential given that six of the last ten prime 
ministers prior to 2008 took office without a general election (Kenig 2009). Importantly, 
surveys of party members in the UK indicate that a primary motivation for membership is 
personal feelings of efficacy from intra-party influence on the policy priorities of the party 
leadership (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley et al. 1994).  
Building on this research, we theorize that party organizations hold implications for 
intra-party politics and consequently the stability of the SDUW\¶Vissue attention in government 
(see Mortensen et al 2011). Motivated by policy goals, party members tend to hold more 
extreme preferences than party leaders and the general electorate (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; 
Whiteley et al. 1994; Schofield and Sened 2006). Furthermore, in mass parties, such as in the 
UK, party leaders are heavily reliant on larger party memberships, but rely on less intensive 
membership campaign tactics when the number of members declines (Schofield and Sened 
2006). This leads us to predict that a SDUW\¶VLQWHUQDOG\QDPLFVand the intra-SDUW\OHDGHU¶V
VHOHFWRUDWHZLOOLQIOXHQFHSDUW\OHDGHUV¶decision-making in office (Harmel and Janda 1994). 
Decreases in the numbers of party members in the UK have freed party leaders to adapt their 
electoral appeals to be more responsive to potential voters (Seyd and Whiteley 2004; 
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Schofield and Sened 2006). For example, Seyd and Whiteley (2004) describe this tradeoff for 
Labour in 1983 (on to nuclear weapons, public ownership and public housing) and the 
Conservatives under John Major (the µEDFNWREDVLFV¶SURJUDPPHRIVRFLDODQGPRUDO
conservatism) in which both parties proposed policies which were much more in line with the 
preferences of their members than those of their broader potential electoral supporters.   
More broadly, we argue that change in intra-party politics, such as the number of party 
members, influences the ability of the party to maintain a stable platform. Intra-party volatility 
OLPLWVSDUWLHV¶DELOLW\WRPDLQWDLQDVWDEOHDJHQda or a similar focus on issues year after year.  
Parties that dramatically lose members face the challenge of attracting new groups while 
appeasing the traditional core groups within the party (Kitschelt 1989).Party leaders depend 
on intra-SDUW\JURXSV¶VXSSRUWWRRUJDQL]Helection campaigns and manage the party 
organization and PXVWUHVSRQGWRWKHLUPHPEHUV¶JRDOVSeyd and Whiteley 1992; Schofield 
and Sened 2006; Cross and Blais 2012; Schumacher 2013; Schumacher et al 2013). Party 
members often hold more extreme preferences than leaders (Whiteley and Seyd 1992; Seyd 
and Whiteley 1994) and are less willing to compromise their policy goals to win elected office 
(Schofield and Sened 2006). Furthermore, party leaders depend more on the electoral support 
RIWKHSDUW\¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQZKHQa party holds a larger membership (Seyd and Whiteley 2004; 
Schofield and Sened 2006; Schumacher 2013). Based on this research, we assume that when 
party members have greater influence because of their size party leaders will be less likely to 
make major changes in issue attention.3 Our first hypothesis combines this organizational 
decision-making logic to the level of agenda stability. 
                                                          
3 1RWHWKDWZHDUHGLVFXVVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRISROLF\SULRULWLHVDQGQRWWKHORFDWLRQRIPHPEHUV¶
preferences. While there are clear contexts in which intra-SDUW\JURXSV¶SUHIHUHQFHVGLYHUJH
(see for example Hug and Schultz 2007; Ceron 2012 and 2013; Greene and Haber 
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H1) Higher party membership increases agenda stability.  
 
As strategic actors, party leaders act to balance their policy goals with goals for 
winning elections and controlling office (Strøm 1990; Adams 1999; Spoon 2011). For 
example, parties change their policy preferences or discuss new issues as an electoral strategy 
( Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009; de Vries and Hobolt 2012). Models of 
electoral competition assume that parties develop policy in office that is consistent with the 
goals of their voters to avoid appearing unaccountable (Downs 1957; Adams 1999). Scholars 
ILQGWKDWWKLVDSSHDUDQFHLQIOXHQFHVPXFKRISDUWLHV¶EHKDYLRULQSDUOLDPHQWVXFKDVWKH
application of parliamentary procedures (Huber 1992; 1996), roll call votes (Carey 2009) and 
parliamentary questions (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011).  
Following from this literature, we add WKDWWKHIDFWRUVZKLFKLQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV¶
electoral calculus, such as the economy, are likely to DOVRLPSDFWWKHSDUOLDPHQW¶Vissue 
attention in a chamber dominated by a single party. Parties change their electoral strategies 
based on information they have about their potential electoral success. They use signals such 
as the state of the economy or public opinion to craft their electoral messages (Adams et al. 
2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Williams et al. forthcoming; redacted). Substantial literature 
finds that governing parties expect voters to punish them for poor economic performance 
(Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
When parties expect to do well, they see little reason to meddle with their electoral strategy, 
whereas parties that expect to lose or decrease votes alter their strategies more dramatically 
(e.g. Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009). Economic conditions also 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
forthcoming), agenda stability will be mostly influenced by differences in how parties allocate 
their attention across issues.  
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influence the levels of intra-party disagreement; negative economic conditions increase the 
range of preferences expressed at party national meetings for incumbents and decrease 
disagreement for opposition parties (Greene and Haber forthcoming). Furthermore, Williams 
et al. (forthcoming) present compelling evidence that incumbent parties responsible for 
declining economic performance place greater attention on economic issues in their election 
campaigns. Governments also show greater attention to economic policy relative to other 
issues when the economy is salient (Jennings et al. 2011b). 
TKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGDDOVRUHIOHFWVSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOJRDOV. Parties may change the 
focus of their attention when economic signals indicate that voters will hold them responsible. 
Parties fear punishment for appearing incompetent, inactive or unconcerned when the 
economy declines. However, a strong economy allows parties to pursue their planned agenda 
without fear of punishment, as voters consider them more competent on a range of issues 
(Green and Jennings 2011a; 2011b). Poor economic conditions, therefore, lead to greater 
agenda stability across issues as the government limits its attention to economic policies,4 but 
becomes less stable as the government focuses on a broader range of problems when the 
economy improves. This argument follows from related findings on the effect of the level of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLFIRFus on the ability to attend to other issues (Jennings et al 
2011b) and is consistent with Green-3HGHUVRQDQG0RUWHQVHQ¶VILQGLQJWKDWSDUWLHV
respond to economic conditions in office.5 Our second hypothesis summarizes this logic. 
                                                          
4 Agenda stability does not mean that parties are inactive, but on the contrary, signals that 
they are dedicating their resources and attention to the specific issues they believe will solve 
the economic situation.   
5 While agenda setting research has emphasized economic conditions as important in the past, 
these explanations were often posed as evidence of a lack of party influence. Party politics 
UHVHDUFKHUVKRZHYHUFRQVLGHUWKHHFRQRP\DVDQLPSRUWDQWGULYHURISDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQ
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H2a) A poor economy increases agenda stability. 
 
However, this relationship reverses following a partisan transition. Parties with 
alternate ideological prescriptions for the economy will see little reason to address the 
economy in the same way as their fallen competitor. Instead, the new party in power faced 
with a poor economic situation will substantially shift the agenda towards its set of economic 
solutions. For example, the Labour Party may choose to focus its attention to issues related to 
ZRUNHUV¶EHQHILWV under a weak economy, whereas the Conservative party would instead 
choose to address regulations on business groups (Hibbs 1977).  Therefore, the following 
hypothesis adds party transitions as a moderating factor for the effect of economic conditions 
on agenda stability; 
 
H2b)  A poor economy decreases agenda stability following a partisan transition. 
 
In addition to intra-party politics and responses to economic conditions, the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\ to control parliament also influences agenda stability. Substantial 
literature finds WKDWSDUWLHV¶DELOLW\WRZLQYRWHVLQSDUOLDPHQWSOD\s an important role in 
determining their ability to achieve policy goals. Parties in parliaments with weak party 
discipline, when members of the same party IUHTXHQWO\YRWHDJDLQVWWKHSDUW\OHDGHUVKLS¶V
proposals, are limited in the range of policies they can pass by differences in the policy 
preferences of its own members (Carey 2009). Party leaders use various legislative procedures 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
campaigns and success (see for example Williams et al. forthcoming; Greene and Haber 
forthcoming). The novelty of our argument is to reinterpret the effect of economic conditions 
through the lens of party competition. 
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to encourage party members to vote in a certain way, such as attaching votes of confidence to 
legislation, limiting amendments or by controlling the voting order in which proposals are 
presented (Huber 1992, 1996a; Döring 2001; 2003). Parliaments with procedures that provide 
leaders with substantial legislative control and consequently high levels of discipline should 
not face as many difficulties initiating their policy goals (Döring 2001; 2003; Bevan et al 
2011). Despite the high levels of discipline in the House of Commons, we argue that British 
governments are also limited by their ability to pass Acts of Parliament. Since World War II 
Parliament averaged only 59 Acts per year. From this perspective, governing parties that hold 
a small majority may face the need for greater intra-party log-rolls or bargains to ensure 
complete party support for certain Acts. Larger parliamentary majorities allow the 
government to focus on its legislative agenda while still allowing for a certain degree of intra-
party disagreement (Huber 1996) or in the case of the UK backbench rebellions.  
This logic fits well with theories of party discipline that indicate that party leaders 
have more options for obtaining a majority in voting when the party has a large majority (e.g. 
Cox and McCubbins 1994; Cox 2000). Indeed, the procedures available to the prime minister 
in the House of Commons give the leadership substantial tools to encourage parliamentary 
discipline (Cox 1987; Döring 2001; 2003), but require majorities within parliament to support 
the passage of legislation. Despite high levels of parliamentary discipline, the leader of a party 
with a small legislative majority may be forced to offer policy concessions as inducements to 
members that might otherwise defect from the party line. Furthermore, in a first-past-the-post 
electoral system larger majorities include a greater number of actors within the party with a 
diverse range of electoral constituents. To maintain an appearance of party unity (Ceron 
2013), party leaders may avoid forcing votes on contentious issues (negative agenda control) 
WRSURWHFW03V¶DQGWKHSDUW\¶VIXWXUHHOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV (Cox 2000; Martin 2004). The recent 
free vote on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 where members were not instructed 
by their parties on how to vote demonstrates the caution that exists in the UK system. In 
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general, the agenda will be more stable from this perspective when the governing party only 
needs to maintain the support of a fraction of its members, rather than all of them.  
 
H3a) A larger parliamentary majority increases agenda stability.  
 
/LNH+XEHU¶VILQGLQJRQWKHWLPLQJRIOHJLVODWLYHSURFHGXUHVQHZJRYHUQPHQWV
prioritize their electoral priorities early in the new legislative cycle (see also Martin 2004). 
Large majorities in this setting have an upper hand following a partisan transition. Party 
leaders require fewer procedures and inducements to find a majority on which intra-party 
consensus exists on an issue when the party holds a larger majority.  Instead, parties with a 
smaller majority require greater intra-party bargaining and require greater time to enact their 
preferred policies. This perspective connects well to studies of coalition governance and 
policy change. Like governing coalitions, parties focus first on the easily negotiated policies 
before moving on to more contentious topics (Martin 2004). Larger majorities, therefore, 
quickly enact their policy priorities. A large majority, which includes a large number of new 
MPs, leads to a less stable agenda following a transition because of the contrast between the 
QHZJRYHUQPHQW¶Vand the RXWJRLQJSDUW\¶Vagendas. The following hypothesis summarizes 
our expectation linking the size of the majority in parliament to agenda stability following a 
transition.  
 
H3b)  A larger parliamentary majority decreases agenda stability following a 
partisan transition. 
 
Although we expect intra-SDUW\SROLWLFVHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVDQGSDUWLHV¶DELOLW\WR
FRQWUROSDUOLDPHQWWRLQIOXHQFHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGD, we add that elections and the 
partisan transitions that follow from them provide the greatest opportunity for partisan 
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differences to arise. Elections provide voters with the opportunity to choose between parties 
with competing electoral platforms and policy proposals (Downs 1957). When a new party 
comes into power, parties seek to enact their policy proposals both because they sincerely 
value those goals and because they instrumentally value those goals so that they can win 
future elections by appearing accountable to voters (Strøm 1990). Once parties are in office, 
WKH\PD\IHHOOLWWOHQHHGWRFKDQJHWKHLUSROLF\IRFXV$VVXPLQJWKDWSDUWLHV¶SROLF\SULRULWLes 
remain stable in office, we predict that the agenda should become increasingly stable the 
longer a party controls the government.  
 
H4) Time controlling government increases agenda stability. 
 
Data and Methods 
 This paper focuses on the UK Policy Agendas Project Acts of the UK Parliament 
dataset from 1945 to 2008 and covers 19 major topic codes that encompass all the issues the 
UK Parliament deals with (see www.policyagendas.org.uk for the data and complete details 
concerning its coding). UK Acts of Parliament are the primary legislation enacted by the UK 
Parliament, which is headed by the prime minister and supported generally by a single party 
throughout this time period.6  
We argue that the UK is a difficult test of our theory for a number of reasons.  In 
particular, previous literature on the policy agenda has found little support for an effect of 
parties on policy attention (Jennings et al 2011a; Bevan et al 2011). Based on this literature, 
we would expect little or no evidence of party effects on agenda stability in the UK. High 
levels of party discipline in parliament and single party majorities mean that small changes in 
                                                          
6 With the exception of the Labour minority government from February 1974 to October 1974 
a majority controlled parliament from 1945 to 2008. 
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SDUWLHV¶RUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHOHJDWLRQVKRXOGEHOHss likely to have much of an 
impact, unless parliamentary leaders react to intra-party politics (Döring 2001; 2003). Given 
that many of our hypotheses predict an effect from within party differences (Cox 1987; 2000), 
rules favoring high levels of party discipline in parliament and that provide the cabinet with 
substantial control of the parliamentary voting agenda stack the deck against our theory. 
Although these same conditions make for a relatively weak test of the broad party matters 
thesis, we are quite confident that if we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses that we 
can make valid inferences to other parliamentary democracies with weaker levels of 
parliamentary discipline.  
Using data from the UK Policy Agendas Project, we calculate a measure of agenda 
stability (see Mortensen et al 2011) as our dependent variable.7 Agenda stability captures the 
degree of similarity in the complete issue attention for Acts of Parliament across all issues 
from year to year. We calculate agenda stability using the following formula: 
 
                                                          
7 Related research has focused on attention diversity summarizing the level of diffusion 
between issue areas in political agendas (see Jennings et al 2011b) using the most appropriate 
PHDVXUH6KDQQRQ¶V+VHH%R\GVWXQHWDO:KLOHDQRWKHULPSRUWDQWVXPPDU\RI
political agendas, our interest in policy stability lead us to focus on a measure derived from 
Mortensen et al (2011). This measure allows us to be neutral about the types of issues parties 
address to look for systematic change in the aggregate agenda rather than the diversity of that 
agenda and the tradeoff between issues (see Jennings et al 2011). These indicators are clearly 
related, as a perfectly stable agenda from year to year would also exhibit a stable level of 
diversity. Empirically, the measures are only weakly related; the correlation between 
6KDQQRQ¶V+DQGRXUPHDVXUHRIDJHQGDVWDELOLW\LVWKH\DUHUHODWHGEXWDOVRFOHDUO\
different measures.  
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 ܣܵ௧ ൌ ͳͲͲ െ ሺ෍ ȁܣܿݐݏ௜௧ െ ܣܿݐݏ௜௧ିଵȁሻ௡௜ୀଵ Ȁʹ (1) 
 
Where Acts is equal to the percentage of acts in an issue at time t and time t-1 with the 
absolute value of the difference summed over all possible issues in the agenda (n). This value 
is divided by 2 as the maximum value is equal to 200 and the minimum value is 0 and is 
subtracted from 100 so that the agenda stability (AS) is highest at 100 and lowest at 0. Agenda 
stability therefore measures how consistent attention is across issues from one year to the 
next. If the exact same percentage of acts is devoted to each issue in year t and t-1, agenda 
stability is equal to 100. If every issue switches from some percentage to 0% and from 0% to 
some percentage then agenda stability is equal to 0.8   
 Take for example a hypothetical parliament limited to passing only two acts of 
parliament each year. In this parliament, agenda stability equals 100 every year if both acts 
address the same issue, such as healthcare. If some shock occurred that caused the party to use 
one act for environmental policy (instead of healthcare), then agenda stability would drop to 
50. Despite the same number of acts each year, this drop in stability indicates that the topics 
the government addressed changed. Agenda stability allows us to focus on the aggregate level 
of substantive changes in the issues included in acts over time without having to make strong 
assumptions about which issues new parties will emphasize.  
The agenda stability of UK Acts of Parliament from 1945 to 2008 is presented in 
Figure 1. The x-axis, Parliamentary Year, indicates the year in which parliament opened for a 
                                                          
8 OXUPHDVXUHRIDJHQGDVWDELOLW\LVVDOLHQFHQHXWUDORUµQRQ-GLUHFWLRQDO¶6DOLHQFHFDQ
increase or decrease on an issue and it will register as a change in attention stability. While 
this limits our ability to make strong statements about exact policy changes, it provides us 
with an aggregate indicator of how stable the attention of parties is across years, regardless of 
the direction of policy. 
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new session with the Speech from the Throne. The start of a new parliamentary session occurs 
at the end of the calendar year or in May for years with an election (Jennings et al 2011a). In 
this figure, we note the majority party and partisan transitions with vertical dashed lines. 
Elections not resulting in a transition are noted with vertical dotted lines. 
 
 [insert Figure 1 about here]  
 
As Figure 1 shows there are no obvious patterns in agenda stability by party, elections 
or transitions from a visual inspection of the measure in the figure.9 It is however noteworthy 
how stable our measure of agenda stability tends to be. While there are clear cases when a 
party transition associates with decreased stability, the mean agenda stability of Acts of 
Parliament is clear and persistent over time. Specification tests of this measure revealed our 
measure of agenda stability to be white noise with a signal significant spike in both the auto-
correlation and partial auto-correlation functions.10  
 To fully test our hypotheses, we make use of an auto-distributed lag model of agenda 
stability which includes a series of independent variables and interactions to account for the 
conditional nature of our hypotheses. The model also includes a lagged dependent variable to 
account for the time series nature of agenda stability. The first of our independent variables 
measures the number of registered party members in the electorate of the party in power (see 
                                                          
9 As a robustness check, we include a dummy variable equal to one when the Conservative 
party is in government. This produced the same inferences for all our independent variables 
with the Conservative party dummy variable itself being positive but insignificant.  
10 As these specification tests are somewhat ambiguous we ran our analyses using both a first 
order autoregressive term as presented and a first order moving average. The results of these 
analyses led to consistent inferences in both cases.  
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McGuinness 2012). This measure provides a crude but reliable measure of the size of the 
intra-party organizational mechanism and the associated difficulty with maintaining a 
parsimonious policy program with higher membership numbers. Overall, our first hypothesis 
predicts that a larger party membership leads to increased agenda instability for both parties.11 
 Our second independent variable captures the overall state of the economy through the 
UK misery index, a measure created through the addition of the unemployment and inflation 
rates. We chose this measure of economic circumstances instead of unemployment or 
inflation to create an ideologically neutral measure of the economy. This approach avoids the 
potential issues posed by associating specific parties with their assumed historical issue 
ownership, such as the relationship between the Labour party and unemployment that may 
make the effect of these individual measures somewhat ambiguous (Hibbs 1977; Budge and 
Farlie 1983). Misery on the other hand increases as the general economic condition worsens 
which should affect both Conservative and Labour governments in a similar manner.12  
 We also include a measure of the majority size calculated as the percentage seats the 
government party controls as the total number of seats in parliament varies from a low of 625 
to a high of 659 seats making a count of seats inconsistent over time.13 Given our interest in 
                                                          
11 Using logged membership instead of the raw number of members leads both the 
constitutive term and its interaction with government transition to become positive and 
significant, consistent with the first hypothesis. 
12 Alternative models using GDP as a general measure of the state of the economy produce 
the same general inferences, but were noticeably poorer fitting.  
13 We reran the analysis using the number of government seats rather than the percentage 
seats and found substantively similar results, although the effect of government size in non-
transition years just barely dropped below conventional levels of significance. Likewise, using 
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WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRLQWHUQDOO\QHJRWLDWHWRILQGDSDUOLDPHQWDU\PDMRULW\LQWKHWKLUG
set of hypotheses, wHPHDVXUHJRYHUQPHQWVL]HDVWKHPDMRULW\SDUW\¶VVHDWVGLvided by the 
total number of seats in parliament and multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. Nearly all 
governments (see Footnote 6) throughout the period control a majority of seats in the 
parliament. In the UK, a smaller majority size should arguably make for a less stable 
government, one unable to easily maintain a set policy program as party leaders are forced to 
LQGXFH03VWRVXSSRUWWKHSDUW\¶VSROLF\SURSRVDOV.  
To account for partisan transitions in power, we make use of a party transition dummy 
variable. This measure is coded 1 in the first parliamentary year directly following an election 
that led to a change in the party majority. Analyses of the effect of both pre- and post- election 
dummy variables as possible alternative measures led to poorer fitting models and less fruitful 
results.14 However, given our theoretical expectations the real effect of elections on stability 
should only occur when an election leads to a change in government. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the logged percentage of seats, leads to substantively similar results and actually increases the 
level of significance to the 95% level for the effect in non-transition years. 
14 We also performed the analysis with alternative specifications to check the robustness of 
our model. These include a dummy variable for change in the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
instead of party transitions as changes in Chancellors often represent changes in party 
direction even for incumbent parties. In this model the coefficients for each of the primary 
independent variables lead to the same inferences, but a poorer fitting model. We also test for 
an effect from the length of time in the opposition prior to a transition. This variable is 
negative and significant, but does not improve the model fit.  Like Baumgartner et al (2009), 
we also ran a version of the analysis with a dummy variable indicating a change in the prime 
minister. The coefficient is negative, but never statistically significant. This alternative model 
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We further include an interaction of our transition dummy variable with our party 
membership, misery index and majority size variables. We expect the effects of party 
membership to be in the same direction regardless of a transition. A higher party membership 
during a transition will likely produce a less radical shift in policy as a high membership also 
relates to a more ideologically centrist program and less consensus within the party (see 
Ceron 2013; Greene and Haber forthcoming). A high value for misery also leads to a unique 
effect; bad economic circumstances and a party transition will lead to a large and observable 
shift in policy as governments pursue alternate possible solutions to poor economic 
circumstance. Finally, government parties with a larger majority are more quickly capable of 
implementing its policy program and therefore, more dramatically destabilize the agenda in 
the first year following a transition.  
 Our final independent variable measures the number of years a party has been in 
power. This government age variable is a count variable from 1 that indicates how many years 
a party has controlled the prime minister. This measure captures our general belief that parties 
become better able to maintain a stable agenda over time when accounting for each of the 
above effects.  
 
Analyses 
 Table 1 presents our auto-distributed lag model of agenda stability from 1945 to 2008. 
Because of the nature of our variables, particularly the transition variable each of our 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
also leads to the same inferences, but a poorer fitting model with the party membership 
variable dropping below standard levels of statistical significance. 
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independent variables is treated as contemporaneous.15 Figures 2-4 present the predicted 
effects of each of our three interactions on agenda stability. 
 
[insert Table 1 and Figures 2-4 about here] 
 
The results from the analysis largely support our hypotheses and the logic behind our 
partisan explanations of agenda stability. As suggested in Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for 
party membership and its interaction with party transition are both positive. The marginal 
effect of party membership during a transition (presented at the bottom of Table 1)16 is 
statistically different from zero at the 99% confidence level. The size of this effect is 
presented in Figure 2. This indicates that parties that have a larger membership in the 
electorate maintain a more stable agenda immediately following a partisan transition. By 
employing a bigger winning intra-party coalition the party cannot as easily break with the 
issue attention of the SDVWJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLWLFDODJHQGD. Interestingly, the effect is only 
statistically significant for the interaction with partisan transition. Party members may only 
GRPLQDWHWKHSDUW\¶VDJHQGDZKHQWKHPHPEHUVKLSLVSD\LQJWKHFORVHVWDWWHQWLRQ to its 
                                                          
15 Alternative models using lagged variables other than transition led to a much poorer fitting 
model and only marginally significant results on our main independent variables. However, as 
it is unlikely that agenda stability is a main contributing factor in economic misery, party 
membership or majority size we believe that the use of contemporaneous effects is justified.  
16 As our model uses interaction terms to test the differing effects of our independent variables 
following partisan transitions the interacted terms as well as the transition variable cannot be 
directly interpreted. Specifically, the constitutive transition variable should not be interpreted 
as a generally positive effect on agenda stability following a transition as its total effect when 
considering the other variables it is interacted with in the model is generally negative. 
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behavior in government: immediately following an electoral victory. The party can then more 
easily change its agenda in the years that follow a transition. 
There is also evidence that the economy plays an important role in government agenda 
stability. As predicted by H2a, the positive and significant coefficient for the misery index 
indicates that greater economic misery increases the agenda stability. This demonstrates that 
as the economy performs poorly governments double down on their policies attempting to 
turn around economic circumstances through their existing policy program. The large, 
negative and significant marginal effect for misery during a partisan transition provides 
evidence for H2b. Following a partisan transition, the new party in government shifts the 
agenda to focus on different priorities than the prior government when faced with negative 
economic conditions. We present the substantive magnitude of these effects over different 
values of the misery index in Figure 3. 
 These results match case-specific evidence of party transitions under a poor economy.  
For example, when the Conservative party came into power under Thatcher in the 1979, the 
new government changed the agenda to focus on issues such as deregulation of financial 
markets, creating flexible labour markets and the privatization of state owned industries 
decreasing overall agenda stability. The previous Labour government had dedicated its policy 
attention primarily to relations with reducing unemployment, reforming Trade Unions and 
keeping prices and inflation low ³7KDWFKHUZLQV7RU\ODQGVOLGH´.17  
 This finding also connects well with studies from an economic voting perspective. 
Seeking to appear accountable to their primary constituents, parties focus on the economic 
priorities of these groups when they enter into office (Hibbs 1977; Hicks and Swank 1992; 
Petrocik 1996). Furthermore, this increased instability indicates real difference between the 
                                                          
17 See for example, the Labour and Conservative Party Manifestos from 1979, 
http://politicsresources.net/area/uk/man.htm, Accessed 2/17/2014/  
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issues parties use to approach dealing with poor economic conditions. This difference 
suggests that choice between the government and opposition parties leads to real differences 
in government outcomes and that at least part of the motivation for economic voting, a desire 
for a change in policy by the electorate, takes place. 
Like economic conditions and intra-party politics, the results support our expectations 
based RQWKHVL]HRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VPDMRULW\LQSDUOLDPHQW. In particular, we find evidence 
for H3a that parties with a larger majority maintain a more stable agenda, although the 
coefficient is only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. As we expect from 
H3b, this effect is reversed for parties following a partisan transition; majority size has a 
negative effect and is significant at the 99% confident interval during a party transition. 
Parties with a larger majority are less affected by backbench rebellions and therefore can 
better focus the agenda on party priorities. Governments with smaller legislative delegations 
face difficulty with the more controversial elements of their agenda. We demonstrate these 
effects for different majority sizes  in Figure 4. 
As the discussion of intra-SDUW\SROLWLFVWKHHFRQRP\DQGWKHSDUW\¶VSDUOLDPHQWDU\
majority demonstrate, there is a clear effect for SDUWLHV¶WLPHLQRIILFH. The time between 
transitions is noteworthy, not just in how parties react to membership, misery and majority 
size, but in their general pattern of increasing stability over time. The years in power variable 
indicates that the longer a party stays in government the more stable the agenda generally 
becomes with a positive and significant effect at the 95% level. This matches H4 and 
indicates that governments professionalize and stabilize over time, increasing their ability to 
maintain a stable agenda. This likely indicates an HIIHFWIURPSDUWLHV¶JUHDWHU expertise at 
implementing and maintaining their agenda with greater time in office.  
Finally, lagged agenda stability is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level, 
but noticeably smaller than most autoregressive series. Given the inconclusive specification 
tests concerning the time series properties of our agenda stability variable this is, however, to 
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be expected. Alternative models employing either a moving average or dropping the lagged 
agenda stability measure of the model produced the same inferences for each of our 
hypotheses, but were poorer fitting. 
 
Conclusion 
 Our focus on agenda stability moves away from two of the most traditional methods 
for assessing partisan influence: attention to single issues and/or preferences over those issues. 
By focusing on a non-directional and aggregated measure of attention we can assess the 
degree of change in party programs based on intra-party and contextual characteristics 
without the need to measure preferences or make strong assumptions concerning the 
ownership of specific issues. Through our analyses we find clear evidence of significant and 
consistent ways through which parties¶FDSDFLWLHV and context influence the distribution of 
issue DWWHQWLRQLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V policy agenda. The effect for each of our primary 
explanatory variables is clearest immediately following partisan transitions. Parties with more 
members in the electorate increase agenda stability following a transition, although the 
number becomes less important later in the legislative cycle. Likewise, parties respond to 
economic conditions differently. New governments take a different approach than previous 
governments under poor economic conditions, yet parties maintain a stable agenda in 
response to a weak economy once they are in power. Finally, parties with a clearer legislative 
majority are more capable of dominating the legislative agenda than parties with smaller 
majorities. This effect is most pronounced following a transition when they can more quickly 
VKLIWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGD This dominance allows governments later in the legislative 
cycle to maintain more consistent attention to their issue priorities. 
7KHVWDELOLW\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHnda also exhibits expected patterns over time 
with generally increasing agenda stability the longer a government is in power. For change to 
happen within government the economy must be booming.  Parliamentary leaders with small 
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government majorities must bargain for intra-party support, negotiate log rolls, or enforce 
party discipline across issues to enact their most preferred legislation. Governing parties are 
unlikely to change their agenda unless a strong economy allows them some additional leeway 
to expand the scope of their policy priorities. In addition, small majorities may be forced to 
compromise with minority groups to protect their greater agenda in office.  
By focusing on a case with high levels of parliamentary discipline and still finding 
effect of intra-party variation, the results of our hypotheses on intra-party politics and 
parliamentary delegations should extend to countries with lower levels of discipline and less 
hierarchical parties. These results build on recent studies of party organizational change 
(Schumacher 2013; Schumacher et al. 2013) and parliamentary behavior (Ceron 2013) that 
find real evidence of intra-party politics on government behavior. However, future research 
will have to uncover the extent to which similar dynamics within and between parties occurs 
in multiparty democracies with regular governing coalitions. Issue level evidence suggests a 
prominent role for both government and opposition parties dependent on the coalition 
bargaining dynamics (e.g. Green-Pederson and Korgstrup 2008; Seeberg 2013). 
 Unlike previous studies from an agenda-setting perspective, these results paint a clear 
picture of aggregate SDUWLVDQLQIOXHQFHRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGD based on party 
memberships, majorities, the economy and professionalization while in government. Our 
results help explain the previous lack of evidence of partisan influence. Previous studies 
searched for a partisan effect based on the issues that they assumed parties had a historical 
ownership over, largely finding that parties do not hold fixed preferences for policy on certain 
LVVXHVEDVHGRQWKHLUSDUW\¶VLGHRORJLFDOIDPLO\(e.g. John et al 2014). Importantly, by only 
focusing on a single issue at a time, these previous analyses did not address our fundamental 
question directly; GRHVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\DJHQGDFKDQJHGXHWRSDUW\WUDQVLWLRQV"We 
add a direct test of this question to the agenda-setting literature by demonstrating that parties 
are dynamic organizations which respond to current political contexts. While we have not 
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directly OLQNHGSDUWLHV¶LGHRORJLFDOSUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI policy, we find 
straightforward evidence using our more nuanced approach that the political context 
(eFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVDQGWKHJRYHUQLQJSDUW\¶VDWWULEXWHVOHDGWRVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQ
agenda stability. Therefore, while previous studies generally suggest that the effect of party 
transition on the government agenda is minor on an issue by issue basis, we find the effect of 
transition on the overall agenda is in fact quite noticeable and dependent on the characteristics 
of parties themselves as well as their environment. Our research should serve as a 
complement to previous studies from an issue-by-issue basis by showing the aggregate 
influence of partisan change. Together, the issue level research and our aggregate results tell a 
rich story of the extent to which parties influence policy change. Future research would do 
well to recognize that the attributes of parties and not just their place on a left-right scale 
affect how they function and how they respond to different contexts such as the economy. 
Our results have clear implications for voters and government accountability. Voters 
are increasingly pessimistic towards parties across the democratic world based at least in part 
on the belief that there is little difference between what parties do in government (Dalton 
2008). Our findings optimistically suggest that there are real differences in issues attended to 
in Acts of Parliament following party transitions in government.  However, parties see little 
reason to change their program once they have implemented their agenda in office. This 
evidence supports a model of accountability similar to the economic voting perspective where 
voters reward and punish parties based on economic performance. The logic follows that there 
is little reason to expect parties to change their behavior once they are in government with 
parties doubling-down on their agendas during hard economic times, when the size of their 
majority is strong and the longer they are in power.  
Our analysis provides clear results consistent with our theory using a difficult case for 
within party influence. However, the research design limits our ability to make broad 
generalizations from this analysis. The results may not be fully robust to electoral contexts in 
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which the relative locatioQRISDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVLVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWRYRWHUVWKDQWKHLVVXHV
they discuss (Green and Hobolt 2008). Future research would benefit from testing our more 
nuanced party based explanations in a broader range of countries that include multiparty 
governments or weak parliamentary discipline. More broadly, the results of our analysis 
indicate that scholars would benefit from adopting more discerning measures of party 
characteristics. Party leaders seeking to win future elections must contend with diverse intra-
party groups, changing economic context, and bargain with MPs from within their party to 
maintain a stable agenda. 
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 Figure 1: Agenda Stability by Parliamentary Year, 1945-2008 
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Figure 2: Predicted effect of Party Membership18 
 
  
                                                          
18 The solid black line indicates the predicted change in agenda stability for increasing party 
membership size holding the independent variables at their mean values for the year following 
a party transition. The dashed line shows the predicted effect for agenda stability in non-
transition years. The dotted lines around the solid line represent 95 percent confidence 
intervals based on simulations using 1,000 draws from the estimated variance-covariance 
matrix from the results presented in Table 1. Figures 3 and 4 use the same method for the 
predicted effects of misery and government seat share respectively.  
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Figure 3: Predicted effect of Misery 
 
  
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
0 10 20 30
Misery
Transition No Transition
 
40 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Effect of Government Seat Share 
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Table 1. Time Series Analyses of Agenda Stability, 1945-2008 
Agenda Stabilityt-1 0.361* 
 (0.023) 
Transitiont * Miseryt -2.241*** 
 (0.000) 
Transitiont * Membershipt 0.004* 
 (0.046) 
Transitiont * Majority Sizet -1.361*** 
 (0.001) 
Transitiont 92.777*** 
 (0.000) 
Misery Indext (No Transition) 0.429* 
 (0.033) 
Party Membershipt (No Transition) 0.001 
 (0.421) 
Majority Sizet (No Transition) 46.208+ 
 (0.070) 
Years in Powert 0.514* 
 (0.035) 
Constant 9.585 
 (0.576) 
R2 0.491 
Log likelihood -224.711 
Observations 66 
  
  
Marginal Effects  
Misery Index (Transition) -1.811*** 
 (0.001) 
Party Membership (Transition) 0.005** 
 (0.004) 
Majority Size (Transition) -0.899** 
 (0.005) 
p-values in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
